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ABSTRACT
Private record linkage (PRL) is the problem of identifying pairs
of records that are similar as per an input matching rule from
databases held by two parties that do not trust one another. We
identify three key desiderata that a PRL solution must ensure: (1)
perfect precision and high recall of matching pairs, (2) a proof
of end-to-end privacy, and (3) communication and computational
costs that scale subquadratically in the number of input records.
We show that all of the existing solutions for PRL– including secure
2-party computation (S2PC), and their variants that use non-private
or dierentially private (DP) blocking to ensure subquadratic cost
– violate at least one of the three desiderata. In particular, S2PC
techniques guarantee end-to-end privacy but have either low recall
or quadratic cost. In contrast, no end-to-end privacy guarantee
has been formalized for solutions that achieve subquadratic cost.
is is true even for solutions that compose DP and S2PC: DP
does not permit the release of any exact information about the
databases, while S2PC algorithms for PRL allow the release of
matching records.
In light of this deciency, we propose a novel privacy model,
called output constrained dierential privacy, that shares the strong
privacy protection of DP, but allows for the truthful release of the
output of a certain function applied to the data. We apply this to
PRL, and show that protocols satisfying this privacy model permit
the disclosure of the true matching records, but their execution is
insensitive to the presence or absence of a single non-matching
record. We nd that prior work that combine DP and S2PC tech-
niques even fail to satisfy this end-to-end privacy model. Hence,
we develop novel protocols that provably achieve this end-to-end
privacy guarantee, together with the other two desiderata of PRL.
Our empirical evaluation also shows that our protocols obtain high
recall, scale near linearly in the size of the input databases and
the output set of matching pairs, and have communication and
computational costs that are at least 2 orders of magnitude smaller
than S2PC baselines.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Organizations are increasingly collecting vast amounts of data
from individuals to advance science, public health, and resource
management and governance. In a number of scenarios, dierent
organizations would like to collaboratively analyze their data in
order to mine paerns that they cannot learn from their individual
datasets. For instance, hospitals or health workers in neighboring
cities might want to identify HIV positive patients who have sought
care in multiple cities to quantify the mobility paerns of patients,
and hence the spread of the virus. is requires nding patients who
occur in multiple databases even though the patient records might
not have the same primary key across databases. is problem is
called record linkage, and has been well studied for the last several
decades [6, 9, 13]. In a collaborative analysis across organizations,
privacy is always a concern. In particular, one of the collaborating
parties, say Hospital A, should not be able to tell whether or not a
record is in the database of the other party, say Hospital B, if that
record does not appear in the match output. Privacy constraints
arise due to concerns from individuals who provide their data, such
as hospital patients, or due to contractual or legal obligations that
organizations have to the individuals in their data. is has led to
a eld of research called private record linkage (PRL).
Traditional PRL techniques aim to solve the linkage problem with
a strong privacy goal – no information should be leaked beyond
(a) the sizes of the datasets, and (b) the set of matching records.
However, this strong privacy goal (which we call S2PC) [15] comes
with a high cost. Existing techniques that achieve this goal either
require cryptographically secure comparisons of all pairs of records
(and hence are inecient), or are restricted to equi-joins (and thus
have very low recall). Hence, we formalize our problem as follows:
given private databases DA and DB held by two semi-honest parties,
and a matching rule m, design a protocol Π that outputs pairs of
matching records to both parties and satises three desiderata: (1)
correctness in terms of perfect precision and high recall of matches,
(2) provable end-to-end privacy guarantee, and (3) eciency in terms
of sub-quadratic communication and computational cost in n, where
n = max(|DA |, |DB |). ere are two sources of the cost incurred
by PRL: (1) the number of cryptographic operations, and (2) the
time taken for each cryptographic operation. Our protocols aim to
reduce the number of cryptographic operations (i.e., the number of
secure pairwise comparisons), the rst source of cost, while using
existing techniques to securely compare pairs of records.
Techniques that securely compare all pairs of records (APC) have
a quadratic cost and hence fail to meet the eciency requirement
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of our problem. On the other hand, techniques for ecient pri-
vate set intersection (PSI) [12, 32] satisfy all three desiderata for
equality-like matching rules, but result in poor recall for general
fuzzy matching rules. When records in DA and DB come from the
same discrete domain, one could expand DA by adding all records
that could potentially match with a record in DB , and then nd
matches by running PSI on the expandedDA andDB . However, this
technique can be very inecient: the expanded databases could
be much larger than the input databases for complex matching
functions or when data are high dimensional. A long line of work
[5, 18, 19, 21, 24, 34] has considered scaling APC by using blocking,
which is a standard technique for scaling non-private record link-
age with a small loss in recall of matching pairs. However, blocking
can reveal sensitive properties of input records. We show that such
hybrid protocols do not ensure an end-to-end privacy guarantee
even in solutions where the blocking step satises a strong privacy
notion, called dierential privacy (DP) [10]. is negative result is
in contrast to other success stories [2, 16, 26, 27, 30, 31, 39] on com-
posing DP and secure computation. ese seings either consider
a client-server model where all data sits on the server or consider
aggregated functions across partitioned data where the privacy
goals of DP and secure computation do not conict. In the case of
scaling PRL, neither blocking nor DP blocking naturally composes
with the strong privacy guarantee of S2PC. To our knowledge, this
work presents the rst solution to the above open problem, and
makes the following contributions:
• We propose and formalize three desiderata for the PRL problem:
(1) correctness, or perfect precision and high recall of matches,
(2) provable end-to-end privacy, or insensitivity to the presence
or absence of an individual record that is not a matching record,
and (3) eciency, or communication and computational costs
that scale subquadratically in the input size. We show that all
of the existing solutions for PRL violate at least one of these
three desiderata. (§ 2)
• is motivates us to develop a novel privacy denition, which
we call Output Constrained DP. Protocols satisfying this notion
are allowed to truthfully return the output of a specic function,
but must be insensitive to the presence or absence of individual
records that do not aect the function output. (§ 3.1)
• We adapt the notion of Output Constrained DP to the context
of PRL. Under this privacy notion, computationally bounded
adversaries cannot distinguish two dierent protocol executions
when a single non-matching record is replaced by another non-
matching record in one of the databases. is privacy notion,
named DPRL, allows protocols to truthfully release the set of
matching records. (§ 3.2)
• We show that prior aempts [5, 19, 24] to scale PRL using block-
ing do not satisfy our privacy denition DPRL (eorem 4.7),
and hence fail to achieve stronger privacy guarantees including
dierential privacy or S2PC. (§ 4)
• We develop novel protocols for private record linkage that lever-
age blocking strategies. Our protocols ensure end-to-end pri-
vacy (eorems 4.5 and 4.10), provide at least as much recall as
the non-private blocking strategy (eorems 4.4 and 4.11), and
achieve subquadratic scaling (eorems 4.8 and 4.11).
• Using experiments on real and synthetic data, we investigate the
3-way trade-o between recall, privacy, and eciency. Our key
ndings are: our protocols (1) are at least 2 orders of magnitude
more ecient than S2PC baselines, (2) achieve a high recall and
end-to-end privacy, and (3) achieve near linear scaling in the
size of the input databases and the output set of matching pairs
on real and synthetic datasets. (§ 5)
2 PROBLEM SETTING & STATEMENT
In this section, we formulate our problem: nding pairs of records
that are similar as per an input matching rule while ensuring three
desiderata: correctness, privacy, and eciency. We then discuss prior
aempts to solve this problem and how they do not satisfy one or
more of the three aforementioned desiderata, thus motivating the
need for a novel solution.
2.1 e Private Record Linkage Problem
Consider two parties Alice and Bob who have databases DA and DB .
Let records in DA come from some domain ΣA and let the records
in DB come from domain ΣB . Let m : ΣA × ΣB → {0, 1} denote
a matching rule, and let DA 1m DB denote the set of matching
pairs {(a,b)|a ∈ DA,b ∈ Db ,m(a,b) = 1}. A matching rule can be
distance-metric based: two records match if their distance is less
than a threshold. For example, Euclidean distance is typically used
for numeric aributes, whereas for string aributes, the distance
metric is typically based on q-grams [7, 8, 35], phonetic encoding
[20], or edit distance over strings [3, 29, 33]. A matching rule can
also be conjunctions of predicates over dierent types of aributes.
For instance, two records match if their names dier by at most 2
characters and their phone numbers dier by at most 1 digit. Alice
and Bob would like to jointly compute DA 1m DB .1
Our goal is to design a protocol Π that Alice and Bob can fol-
low to compute DA 1m DB , while satisfying the following three
desiderata – correctness, privacy and eciency.
• Correctness: Let OΠ ⊆ DA × DB denote the set of pairs output
by the protocol Π as the set of matching pairs. e protocol
is correct if (a) the protocol returns to both Alice and Bob the
same output OΠ , and (b) OΠ = DA 1m DB , and incorrect
otherwise. Note that if Alice and Bob indeed receive the same
output, OΠ can only be incorrect in one way – some matching
pairs (a,b) ∈ DA 1m DB are not present in OΠ . is ensures
perfect precision – no false positives. Hence, we quantify the
correctness of a protocol Π using a measure called recall, which
is computed as:
rΠ(DA,DB ) = |OΠ ∩ (DA 1m DB )||DA 1m DB | . (1)
We require Π to have a high recall (close to 1). is precludes
trivial protocols that output an empty set.
• Privacy: We assume that the data inDA andDB are sensitive. As
part of the protocol Π, Alice would like no one else (including
Bob) to learn whether a specic non-matching record a is in
or out of DA; and analogously for Bob. is precludes the
1e standard record linkage problem involves learning a matching function in addition
to computing the matches. Although the problem considered in this paper and in the
private record linkage literature ignores this crucial aspect of record linkage, we have
chosen to also use this term for continuity with existing literature on the topic.
Methods Correctness Privacy Eciency
APC 3 3 7
PSI 7 3 3
PSI+X 3 3 7
PRL+B 3 7 3
PRL+BDP 3 7 3
Table 1: Summary of Prior Work
trivial solution wherein Bob sends DB to DA in the clear so that
Alice can compute DA 1m DB using standard techniques in
the record linkage literature [6]. It also precludes the trivial
solution wherein Alice and Bob send their records to a trusted
third party in the clear who can then compute DA 1m DB .
Formally stating a privacy denition is challenging (as we will
see later in the paper) and is a key contribution of this paper. We
will assume throughout the paper that Alice and Bob are semi-
honest, i.e., they follow the protocol honestly, but are curious
about each others’ databases. We also assume that Alice and
Bob are computationally bounded, i.e., they are probabilistic
polynomially bounded turing machines.
• Eciency: Jointly computing matching records would involve
communication and computational cost. We assume that each
record in the database hasO(1) length; i.e., it does not grow with
n = max(|DA |, |DB |). e communication and computational
costs are bounded below by the output size, i.e. Ω(M), where
M = |DA 1m DA |. If M is quadratic in n, then the costs
have to be quadratic in n to ensure high recall. Hence, we
consider problems with sub-quadratic output size, and we say
that the protocol is ecient if both the communication and
computational costs are sub-quadratic in n, i.e., o(n2).
We formalize our problem statement as follows.
Problem 1 (PRL). LetDA andDB be private databases held by two
semi-honest parties, and letm be a matching rule. Design a protocol
Π that outputs pairs of matching records to both parties such that (1)
Π ensures high recall close to 1, (2) Π provably guarantees privacy,
and (3) Π has sub-quadratic communication and computational cost.
2.2 Prior Work
Before describing our solution, we outline ve approaches for the
PRL problem from prior work – APC, PSI, PSI+X, PRL+B and
PRL+BDP . Table 1 summarizes their (in)ability to satisfy our three
desiderata stated in Problem 1. Other related work on composing
S2PC and DP is discussed in § 6.
2.2.1 All-Pairwise Comparisons (APC). One approach to solve
the PRL problem, which we call APC, works as follows: (1) design
a secure 2-party algorithm that takes as input a record a ∈ DA
and a record b ∈ DB and outputs to both parties the pair (a,b) if
the value of m(a,b) = 1 without leaking any additional informa-
tion, and (2) run the secure comparison algorithm for every pair
of records in DA × DB . e secure comparison primitive can be
implemented either using garbled circuits [40] or (partially) homo-
morphic encryption [28], depending on the matching rule. APC
achieves a recall of 1, but requires a quadratic communication and
computational cost for |DA | × |DB | secure pairwise comparisons.
APC provides a strong end-to-end privacy guarantee – it leaks
no information other than the sizes of the databases and the set of
matching records. is guarantee is formalized as follows.
Denition 2.1 (IND-S2PC [15]). A 2-party protocol Π that com-
putes function f satises IND-S2PC if for anyDA, and for every pair
of DB and D ′B where f (DA,DB ) = f (DA,D ′B ), the view of Alice
during the execution of Π over (DA,DB ) is computationally indis-
tinguishable from the view over (DA,D ′B ), i.e. for any probabilistic
polynomial adversary T ,
Pr [T (VIEWΠA(DA,DB )) = 1]
≤ Pr [T (VIEWΠA(DA,D ′B )) = 1] + negl(κ); (2)
and the same holds for the view of Bob over (DA,DB ) and (D ′A,DB )
for f (DA,DB ) = f (D ′A,DB ). negl(κ) refers to any function that is
o(κ−c ), for all constants c , and VIEWΠA(DA, ·) (VIEWΠB (·,DB ) resp.)
denotes the view of Alice (Bob resp.) during an execution of Π.
e IND-S2PC denition uses κ as a “security” parameter to
control various quantities. e size of the adversary is polynomial
in κ, and the output of the protocol is at most polynomial in κ. e
views of the protocol execution are also parameterized by κ.
In PRL, let f1m be the function that takes as inputs DA and DB ,
and outputs a triple (|DA |, |DB |,DA 1m DB ). e view of Alice,
VIEWΠA(DA, ·), includes (DA, r , m1,…,mt ), where r represents the
outcome of Alice’s internal coin tosses, and mi represents the i-
th message it has received. e output received by Alice aer
an execution of Π on (DA,DB ), denoted OΠA(DA,DB ) is implicit
in the party’s own view of the execution. e view of Bob can
be similarly dened. In addition, the output size of VIEW will be
(at most) polynomial in κ. Intuitively, IND-S2PC ensures that the
adversary Alice cannot distinguish any two databases DB and D ′B
from her view given the constraint f (DA,DB ) = f (DA,D ′B ), and
the same applies to Bob. is IND-S2PC denition is a necessary
condition for the standard simulation-based denition (eorem A.2
in Appendix A.1).
To summarize, APC guarantees end-to-end privacy and provides
a recall of 1, but violates the eciency requirement.
2.2.2 Private Set Intersection (PSI). We call the next class of
approaches PSI, since they were originally designed for ecient
private set intersection. Like APC, PSI also ensures IND-S2PC
and the parties only learn the sizes of the databases and the set
of matching records. e algorithms are ecient, but only ensure
high recall for equality predicate like matching rules [12, 32].
e basic protocol works as follows: Alice denes a polynomial
p(x) whose roots are her set of elements a ∈ DA. She sends the
homomorphic encryptions of the coecients to Bob. For each ele-
ment b ∈ DB , Bob computes the encrypted values b˜ = r · p(b) + b,
where r is a random value, and sends them back to Alice. ese
values are decrypted by Alice and then matched with DA. If b < DA,
then the decrypted value of b˜ will be a random value not matching
any records in DA; otherwise, it will nd a match from DA. e
basic protocol described thus far required O(|DA | + |DB |) commu-
nications and O(|DA × DB |) operations on encrypted values. [12]
further optimizes the computational cost with Horner’s rule and
cryptographic hashing to replace a single high-degree polynomial
with several low-degree polynomials. is reduces the computa-
tional cost to O(|DB | · ln ln |DA |), and hence is sub-quadratic in n,
for n = max(|DA |, |DB |). State of the art PSI techniques [32] further
improve eciency.
PSI techniques are limited to equality like matching functions,
and extensions [12, 41] allow for matching rules that require exact
match on at least t out of T features. However these techniques
achieve poor recall for general matching rules. For example, they
do not extend to matching rules that involve conjunctions and dis-
junctions of similarity functions evaluated on multiple aributes.
ey also do not extend to complex distance metrics, such as Cosi-
neSimilarity(First Name) > 0.9 OR CosineSimilarity(Last Name)
> 0.9, which are typical in record linkage tasks [13].
2.2.3 PSI with Expansion (PSI+X). e PSI technique can be used
to achieve high recall for general matching rules by using the idea
of expansion. Suppose DA and DB have the same domains, i.e.,
ΣA = ΣB = Σ. For every record a ∈ DA, one could add all records
a′ ∈ Σ such thatm(a,a′) = 1 to get an expanded database DxA. An
equi-join between DxA and DB returns the required output DA 1m
DB , and satises IND-S2PC. However, the expanded dataset can be
many orders of magnitude larger than the original dataset making
this protocol, PSI+X, inecient (in the size of the original datasets).
Moreover, enumerating all matches per record is hard for a complex
matching function. For instance, if the matching function m can
encode Boolean 3-CNF formulas, then nding values for a such that
m(a,a′) = 1 could be an intractable problem. In such a case, any
ecient expansion algorithm may need to enumerate a superset of
matches, further increasing the computational cost. Lastly, even for
relatively simple matching functions, we empirically illustrate low
recall of PSI and ineciency of PSI+X protocols respectively in § 5.
2.2.4 PRL with Blocking (PRL+B). Blocking is commonly used
to scale up non-private record linkage. Formally,
Denition 2.2 (Blocking (B)). Givenk bins {B0, ...,Bk−1}, records
in DA and DB are hashed by B to a subset of the k bins. e set
of records in DA (respectively DB ) falling into the ith bin are rep-
resented by Bi (DA) (respectively Bi (DB )). A blocking strategy
BS ⊆ [0,k) × [0,k) species pairs of bins of DA and DB that are
compared, i.e. records in Bi (DA) are compared with records in
Bj (DB ) if (i, j) ∈ BS .
We sometimes use B to refer to the entire blocking algorithm as
well as the blocking functions used in the algorithm. We refer to
the set of pairs of records that are compared by a blocking strategy
as candidate matches. A blocking strategy BS is sub-quadratic if
the number of candidate matches
costBS (DA,DB ) =
∑
(i, j)∈BS
|Bi (DA)| |Bj (DB )|
is o(n2), for n = max(|DA |, |DB |). Blocking techniques are useful
as a pre-processing step [18, 21, 34] to achieve sub-quadratic e-
ciency and high recall. We can use blocking as a pre-processing
step for APC – secure comparison is performed only for the candi-
date matches – resulting in an ecient protocol with high recall.
However, the blocking strategy itself can leak information about
the presence or absence of a record in the database. is was illus-
trated using an aack by Cao et al. [5]. is is because the number
of candidate matches can vary signicantly even if DB and D ′B
dier in only one record. We formally prove this negative result
for a large class of blocking techniques which use locality sensitive
hashing (LSH). A majority of the hash functions used by blocking
algorithms like q-gram based hash signatures [1] or SparseMap
[34] are instances of LSH.
Denition 2.3 (Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH)[14]). A family
of functions H is said to be (d1,d2,p1,p2)-sensitive, where d2 > d1
and p1 > p2, if for all h ∈ H , (1) if dist(a,b) ≤ d1, then Pr [h(a) =
h(b)] ≥ p1, and (2) if dist(a,b) > d2, then Pr [h(a) = h(b)] ≤ p2.
An LSH-based blocking considers a set of bins where each bin
consists of records with the same hash values for all h ∈ H . A
popular blocking strategy is to compare all the corresponding bins,
and results in a set of candidate matches {(a,b)|h(a) = h(b)∀h ∈
H ,a ∈ DA,b ∈ DB }. In general, we can show that any LSH based
blocking cannot satisfy IND-S2PC.
Theorem 2.4. An LSH based blockingwith a family of (d1,d2,p1,p2)-
sensitive hashing functions H cannot satisfy IND-S2PC.
e proof can be found in Appendix B.1.1.
2.2.5 PRL with DP Blocking (PRL+BDP ). Dierential privacy
has arisen as a gold standard for privacy in situations where it is ok
to reveal statistical properties of datasets but not reveal properties of
individuals. An algorithm satises dierential privacy if its output
does not signicantly change when adding/removing or changing
a single record in its input. More formally,
Denition 2.5 ((ϵ,δ )-Dierential Privacy[10]). A randomized mech-
anism M : D → O satises (ϵ,δ )-dierential privacy (DP) if
Pr [M(D) ∈ O] ≤ eϵPr [M(D ′) ∈ O] + δ (3)
for any setO ⊆ O and any pair of neighboring databasesD,D ′ ∈ D
such that D and D ′ dier by adding/removing a record.
A recent line of work has designed dierentially private blocking
algorithms as a preprocessing step to APC. DP hides the presence
or absence of a single record, and hence the number of candidate
matches stays roughly the same onDB andD ′B that dier in a single
record. While this approach seems like it should satisfy all three of
our desiderata, we have found that none of the protocols presented
in prior work (on DP Blocking) [5, 19, 24] provide an end-to-end
privacy guarantee. In fact, each paper in this line of work nds
privacy breaches in the prior work. We also show in the proof of
eorem 4.7 (Appendix B.1.2) that even the most recent of these
protocols in [5] does not satisfy an end-to-end privacy guarantee.
is is because of a fundamental disconnect between the privacy
guarantees in the two steps of these algorithms. DP does not allow
learning any fact about the input datasets with certainty, while
IND-S2PC (and PRL protocols that satisfy this denition) can reveal
the output of the function f truthfully. On the other hand, while
DP can reveal aggregate properties of the input datasets with low
error, protocols that satisfy IND-S2PC are not allowed to leak any
information beyond the output of f . Hence, DP and IND-S2PC do
not naturally compose.
To summarize, none of the prior approaches that aempt to
solve Problem 1 satisfy all three of our desiderata. Approaches that
satisfy a strong privacy guarantee (IND-S2PC) are either inecient
or have poor recall. Ecient PRL with blocking or DP blocking
fail to provide true end-to-end privacy guarantees. A correct con-
ceptualization of an end-to-end privacy guarantee is critical for
achieving correctness, privacy and eciency. Hence, in the follow-
ing sections, we rst dene an end-to-end privacy guarantee for
PRL to address this challenge (§ 3), and then present algorithms
in this privacy framework to achieve sub-quadratic eciency and
high recall (§ 4).
3 OUTPUT CONSTRAINED DP
Designing ecient and correct algorithms for PRL is challenging
and non-trivial because there is no existing formal privacy frame-
work that enables the trade-o between correctness, privacy, and
eciency. In this section, we propose a novel privacy model to
achieve this goal.
3.1 Output Constrained Dierential Privacy
Both IND-S2PC (Def. 2.1) and DP (Def. 2.5) ensure the privacy goal
of not revealing information about individual records in the dataset.
However, there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two
denitions. IND-S2PC reveals the output of a function truthfully;
whereas, nothing truthful can be revealed under dierential privacy.
On the other hand, DP reveals noisy yet accurate (to within an
approximation factor) aggregate statistics about all the records in
the dataset; but, nothing other than the output of a pre-specied
function can be revealed under IND-S2PC.
e dierence between these privacy denitions can be illus-
trated by rephrasing the privacy notions in terms of a distance
metric imposed on the space of databases. Without loss of general-
ity, assume Alice is the adversary. Let G = (V ,E) denote a graph,
whereV is the set of all possible databases that Bob could have and
E is a set of edges that connect neighboring databases. e distance
between any pair of databases is the shortest path distance in G.
Intuitively, the adversary Alice’s ability to distinguish protocol exe-
cutions on a pair of databases DB and D ′B is larger if the shortest
path between the databases is larger.
DP can be represented by the set of edges that connect neighbor-
ing databases that dier in the presence or absence of one record,
|DB\D ′B ∪ D ′B\DB | = 1. is means, any pair of databases DB and
D ′B are connected in this graph by a path of nite length that is
equal to the size of their symmetric dierence. While an adversary
can distinguish protocol executions between some pair of “far away”
databases, the adversary can never tell with certainty whether the
input was a specic database. On the other hand, under IND-S2PC,
every pair of databases that result in the same output for f (DA, ·)
for a given DA are neighbors. However, there is neither an edge nor
a path between databases that result in dierent outputs. us the
output constraint divides the set of databases into disjoint complete
subgraphs (in fact equivalence classes).
Example 3.1. Consider databases with domain {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Given DA = {1, 2}, the graph G for the database instances for
DB are shown in Figure 1. For the graph of dierential privacy
in Figure 1(a), every pair of database instances that dier in one
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Figure 1: Neighboring databases for (a) DP, and (b) IND-S2PC
for Example 3.1.
record is connected by an edge and form a neighboring pair. For
instance, DB = {1} and D ′B = {1, 2} are neighbors under DP.
Figure 1(b) considers an output which consists of the size of DB and
the intersection between DB and DA. Hence, all the instances in
GI ND−S2PC have the same datasize and have the same intersection
with DA = {1, 2}. For example, the fully connected 6 database
instances all have 2 records, but have no intersection with DA. e
instance {1, 2} has no neighboring databases, as it is same as the
output, and hence none of the records in this database instance
requires privacy protection.
Comparing these two graphs, we can see that all instances in
GDP are connected, and hence an adversary can not distinguish
protocol executions on any pair of databases with certainty, but is
allowed to learn statistical properties (with some error). is is not
true under GI ND−S2PC , where some instances are disconnected.
For instance, an adversary can distinguish between protocol exe-
cutions on {1, 2} and {1, 5} since they give dierent outputs when
matched with DA.
From Example 3.1, it is clear that the privacy guarantees given by
DP and IND-S2PC are dierent. To ensure scalable record linkage
with formal privacy guarantees, we need the best of both worlds:
the ability to reveal records that appear in the match truthfully, the
ability to reveal statistics about non-matching records, and yet not
reveal the presence or absence of individual non-matching records in
the dataset. Hence, we propose a weaker, but end-to-end, privacy
denition for the two party seing.
Denition 3.2 (f -Neighbors). Given function f : DA ×DB → O
and DA ∈ DA. For any pairs of datasets DB ,D ′B , let 4(DB ,D ′B ) =
DB\D ′B ∪ D ′B\DB . is is the symmetric dierence between DB
and D ′B , and is the set of records that must be deleted and added to
DB to get D ′B . DB and D
′
B are neighbors w.r.t to f (DA, ·), denoted
by N(f (DA, ·)) if
(1) f (DA,DB ) = f (DA,D ′B ),
(2) 4(DB ,D ′B ) , ∅, and
(3) there is no database D ′′B ∈ DB , where f (DA,DB ) = f (DA,D ′′B ),
such that 4(DB ,D ′′B ) ⊂ 4(DB ,D ′B ).
N(f (·,DB )) is similarly dened.
e third condition ensures that DB and D ′B are minimally dif-
ferent in terms of record changes.
Denition 3.3 (Output Constrained DP). A 2-party PRL protocol
Π for computing function f : DA × DB → O is (ϵA, ϵB ,δA,δB , f )-
constrained dierential privacy (DP) if for any (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N(f (DA, ·)),
the views of Alice during the execution of Π to any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary T satises
Pr [T (VIEWΠA(DA,DB )) = 1]
≤ eϵBPr [T (VIEWΠA(DA,D ′B )) = 1] + δB (4)
and the same holds for the views of Bob with ϵA and δA.
If ϵA = ϵB = ϵ,δa = δb = δ , we simply denote it as (ϵ,δ , f )-
constrained DP. Similar to DP, Output Constrained DP satises
composition properties that are useful for protocol design.
Theorem 3.4 (Seqential Composition). GivenΠ1 is (ϵ1,δ1, f )-
constrained DP, and Π2 is (ϵ2,δ2, f )-constrained DP, then applying
these two protocols sequentially, i.e. Π2(DA,DB ,Π1(DA,DB )) satis-
es (ϵ1 + ϵ2,δ1 + δ2, f )-constrained DP.
Theorem 3.5 (Post-processing). Given Π is (ϵ,δ , f )-constrained
DP, and let OΠ(DA,DB ) be the output aer the execution of Π, then
any probabilistic polynomial (in κ) function д(OΠ(DA,DB )) satises
(ϵ,δ , f )-constrained DP.
See Appendix B.2.1 and B.2.2 for the proofs of eorem 3.4 and
eorem 3.5 respectively. Output constrained DP inherits other
desirable properties from DP, for instance, its robustness to aacks
[17, 36]. We omit details due to space constraints.
3.2 Dierential Privacy for Record Linkage
PRL can be a direct application of Output Constrained Dierential
Privacy by considering f1m . We have the following theorem to
dene the neighboring databases for PRL.
Theorem 3.6 (Neighbors for PRL). Given the function f1m
in PRL, if (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N(f1m (DA, ·)) for a given DA ∈ D, then|DB | = |D ′B |,DB andD ′B must dier in only one pair of non-matching
records with respect to the givenDA, i.e. D ′B = DB −b+b ′ and b , b ′,
wherem(b,a) = 0 andm(b ′,a) = 0 for all a ∈ DA.
Proof. e output constraint f1m (DA,DB ) = f1m (DA,D ′B )
implies that |DB | = |D ′B | and DA 1m DB = DA 1m D ′B . If DB and
D ′B dier in a matching record, then their matching outputs with
a given DA are dierent. Hence DB and D ′B must dier in one or
more non-matching records. In addition, to ensure |DB | = |D ′B |,
the number of non-matching records added to DB to get D ′B must
be the same as the number of non-matching records removed from
DB . If 4(DB ,D ′B ) contains more than one pair of record additions
and deletions, a subset of 4(DB ,D ′B ) can give a valid D ′′B such that
f1m (DA,DB ) = f1m (DA,D ′′B ). Hence, a neighboring pair DB ,D ′B
dier by exactly one pair of non-matching records. 
Next we dene the privacy guarantee that allows us to design
ecient PRL protocols with provable privacy guarantees.
Denition 3.7 (DPRL). A 2-party PRL protocol Π for comput-
ing function f1m : DA × DB → O is (ϵA, ϵB ,δA,δB )-DPRL if Π
satises (ϵA, ϵB ,δA,δB , f1m )-constrained DP.
3.3 Related Privacy Denitions
In this section we discuss related privacy denitions and their
connections with DPRL. First, both DPRL and IND-S2PC assume a
computationally bounded model. We show that DPRL is a weaker
guarantee than IND-S2PC.
Theorem 3.8. All IND-S2PC protocols for record linkage satisfy
(0,negl(κ))-DPRL.
Proof. IND-S2PC for record linkage is equivalent to DPRL with
ϵ = 0 and δ = negl(κ). e δ in DPRL is always greater than negl(κ)
but smaller than o(1/n). 
Hence, APC, PSI, and PSI+X techniques that satisfy IND-S2PC,
guarantee (0,negl(κ))-DPRL as well.
Indistinguishable computationally dierential privacy (IND-CDP-
2PC) [25] is another privacy notion under a computationally bounded
model, and is a direct extension of DP to the two party seing where
both parties are computationally bounded. DPRL is weaker than
IND-CDP-2PC. Formally
Theorem 3.9. If a protocol for record linkage satises ϵ/2-IND-
CDP-2PC, then it satises (ϵ,δ )-DPRL.
e factor 2 arises since neighboring databases protected by
DPRL have a symmetric dierence of 2, while neighboring databases
under IND-CDP-2PC have a symmetric dierence of 1. e detailed
proof can be found in Appendix A.2.
Blowsh Privacy [17] generalizes dierential privacy to prob-
lems where constraints on the input database must hold (e.g., when
certain query answers have been released by the database exactly).
Output Constrained DP, including DPRL, is an extension of Blow-
sh in two ways: (1) from a computationally unbounded model
to a computationally bounded model; (2) from a single-party set-
ting to a two-party seing. Note that with the output constraint
f1m (DA,DB ) = f1m (DA,D ′B ) for record linkage, the number of
dierent records between neighboring databases DB and D ′B is only
two. is is not necessarily true for other applications of Output
Constrained DP, or Blowsh Privacy. is property is desirable for
DP based algorithms since larger distances between neighboring
databases typically require larger perturbation to hide the dierence
between neighbors resulting in poorer utility.
Another instantiation of Blowsh privacy, called Protected DP
[22], aims to ensure the privacy of a protected subpopulation. In
contrast, an unprotected “targeted” subpopulation receives no pri-
vacy guarantees. In DPRL, one could think of the non-matching
records as the protected subpopulation, and the matching records
as the targeted subpopulation. However, unlike in Protected DP,
in DPRL the set of protected records are learned as an output of
the DPRL protocol, and hence are not available as an input to the
protocol like the targeted subpopulation in the Protected DP algo-
rithms.
4 PROTOCOLS FOR DPRL
In this section, we introduce protocols that satisfy DPRL and permit
a 3-way trade-o between correctness, privacy and eciency. We
rst present a class of protocols that achieves (ϵ, negl(κ))-DPRL by
using a blocking strategy that satises local dierential privacy (DP).
ough these protocols achieve high recall with a suciently small
privacy parameter, they only achieve a constant factor speedup in
eciency. Next, we present the Laplace Protocol (LP) that achieves
all three desiderata of high recall, privacy and subquadratic e-
ciency. is protocol hides non-matching records by adding Laplace
noise to the blocking strategy. We also show that aempts from
prior work to use Laplace noise in blocking fail to satisfy DPRL (e-
orem 4.7). Moreover, we design a Sort & Prune (SP) heuristic that is
used in conjunction with LP (as well as the local DP based protocols)
and helps additionally tradeo eciency and recall. Finally, we
present the Greedy Match & Clean heuristic optimization (GMC),
that can further improve eciency. All the protocols presented in
this section are proven to satisfy DPRL.
4.1 Local DP Protocol
Let B be a blocking that randomly hashes records into a pre-
specied set of k bins, such that for all i ∈ [1 . . .k],
Pr[B(b) = i] ≤ eϵ Pr[B(b ′) = i]. (5)
Such a blocking B satises ϵ-local DP (as dened in Appendix A.3),
since each record is perturbed locally independent of the other
records. We show that protocols that combine a local dierentially
private blocking with IND-S2PC protocols for record linkage can
achieve (ϵ, negl(κ))-DPRL.
Theorem 4.1. All IND-S2PC protocols for record linkage with ϵ-
local dierentially private blocking satises (ϵ, negl(κ))-DPRL.
e proof can be found in Appendix C.2. Such local dierentially
private protocols can be constructed from well known local dif-
ferentially private algorithms based on randomized response (RR)
[11] or the Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) transformation [4], where
each record is hashed independent of others. We refer the reader
to Appendix C.2 for a concrete blocking algorithm based on RR.
We show that while this algorithm permits high recall and privacy,
it does not improve eciency by more than a constant factor (a
function of ϵ) (eorem C.1). Whether any local DP based blocking
algorithms can achieve subquadratic eciency is an interesting
open question.
4.2 Laplace Protocol (LP)
4.2.1 Algorithm Description. In this protocol, Alice and Bob
agree on a blocking function B with k bins and strategy BS , which
we take as input to the protocol. e Laplace Protocol (LP, as shown
in Algorithm 1) works by inserting a carefully chosen number of
dummy records into each bin of the blocking strategy such that the
bin sizes are dierentially private. While candidate matches may
contain dummy records, they do not contribute to the output set
of matches, because the dummy records do not match any record.
ese candidate matches are then securely matched using an IND-
S2PC algorithm.
In the rst step (Lines 1-4) of the protocol shown in Algorithm 1,
Alice and Bob take their inputs DA and DB , the agreed blocking
protocol B, and privacy parameters ϵA, ϵB , δA, and δB as input,
and compute noisy bins B˜(DA) and B˜(DB ) respectively. e noisy
bins are constructed as follows (Algorithm 2). Records in D are
rst hashed into bins according to the blocking protocol B, and
B(D) denotes the set of bins of records from D. en the counts
of the bins are perturbed using noise drawn from a truncated and
Algorithm 1: Laplace Protocol (LP)
Input :DA ,DB , ϵA, ϵB , δA, δB , B(including BS )
Output :O
1 // Alice performs the following:
2 B˜(DA) ← LapNoise(DA, B, ϵA, δA) ;
3 // Bob performs the following:
4 B˜(DB ) ← LapNoise(DB, B, ϵB, δB ) ;
5 // Alice and Bob perform the following:
6 O = ∅ ;
7 // Sort & prune BS (§ 4.3)
8 for (i, j) ∈ BS do
9 for a ∈ B˜i (DA) and b ∈ B˜j (DB ) do
10 Add SMC(a, b) to O ;
11 end
12 // Greedy match & clean (§ 4.4)
13 end
14 return O ;
Algorithm 2: Add Laplace Noise
1 function LapNoise (D,B, ϵ,δ );
2 for Bi ∈ B do
3 ηi ∼ Lap(ϵ,δ ,∆B) ;
4 B˜i (D) ← add η+i = max(ηi , 0) dummy records to Bi (D);
5 end
6 return B˜(D);
discretized Laplace distribution, such that the noisy counts satisfy
(ϵ,δ )-DPRL. e Laplace noise depends on not only the privacy
parameters ϵ and δ , but also the sensitivity of the given blocking
protocol B.
Denition 4.2 (Sensitivity of B). e sensitivity of the blocking
strategy B for Bob, denoted by ∆BB is
max
DA ∈D
max
(DB,D′B )∈N(f1m (DA, ·))
k∑
i=0
| |Bi (DB )| − |Bi (D ′B )| |,
the maximum bin count dierence between DB and D ′B for any(DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N(f1m (DA, ·)) for all DA ∈ D. ∆BA for Alice is
similarly dened.
If the hashing of B is the same for Alice and Bob, then ∆BA =
∆BB = ∆B. We assume this in our paper. If B hashes each record
to at most k ′ bins, then ∆B = 2k ′.
Denition 4.3 (Lap(ϵ,δ ,∆B)). A random variable follows the
Lap(ϵ,δ ,∆B) distribution if it has a probability density function
Pr[η = x] = p · e−(ϵ/∆B)|x−η0 | , ∀x ∈ Z, (6)
where p = eϵ/∆B−1
eϵ/∆B+1 , and η
0 = −∆B ln((eϵ/∆B+1)(1−(1−δ )1/∆B ))ϵ .
is distribution has a mean of η0 and takes both positive and
negative values. LP draws a noise value η from this distribution,
and truncates it to 0 if η is negative. en, η dummy records are
added to the bin. ese dummy records lie in an expanded domain,
such that they do not match with any records in the true domain.
Aer Alice and Bob perturb their binned records, they will ini-
tiate secure matching steps to compare candidate matches, i.e.
records in B˜i (DA) × B˜j (DB ) if (i, j) ∈ BS . For each candidate
match (a,b), Alice and Bob participate in a two party secure match-
ing protocol SMC(a,b) that outputs the pair (a,b) to both Alice
and Bob if m(a,b) = 1 (true matching pair) and null otherwise.
Secure matching can be implemented either using garbled circuits
[40] or (partially) homomorphic encryption [28], depending on the
matching rule (see Appendix C.1 for an example).
4.2.2 Correctness Analysis. Compared to the original non-private
blocking protocol B, no records are deleted, and dummy records
do not match any real record. Hence,
Theorem 4.4. Algorithm 1 gives the same recall as the non-private
blocking protocol B it takes as input.
4.2.3 Privacy Analysis. Next, we show that LP satises DPRL.
Theorem 4.5. Algorithm 1 satises (ϵA, ϵB ,δA,δB )-DPRL.
Proof. We prove privacy for Bob (the proof for Alice is analo-
gous). In this protocol, Alice with input data DA has a view con-
sisting of (1) the number of candidate matching pairs arising in
each (i, j) ∈ BS , (2) the output for each candidate matching pair.
Algorithm 1 is the composition of two steps: (a) add dummy records
to bins, and (b) secure comparison of records within bins.
Consider a neighboring pair (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N (f1m (DA, ·)) for a
given DA. By eorem 3.6, DB and D ′B dier in only one non-
matching record with respect to DA, i.e. D ′B = DB − b∗ + b ′∗ and
b∗ , b ′∗, where m(b∗,a) = 0 and m(b ′∗,a) = 0 for all a ∈ DA. DB
and D ′B can dier by at most ∆B in their bin counts. We show
in Lemma B.2 (Appendix) that Algorithm 2 adds a sucient num-
ber of dummy records to hide this dierence: with probability
1 − δB , the probabilities of generating the same noisy bin counts
for Bob, and hence the same number of candidate matching pairs
consisting in each (i, j) ∈ BS from DB and D ′B are bounded by eϵB .
us, Step (a) ensures (ϵB ,δB )-DPRL for Bob. Given a xed view
from Step (a) which consists of the noisy bin counts and encrypted
records from B˜(DB ), Alice’s view regarding the output for each
candidate matching pair (a,b) is the same. e encrypted records
for a given noisy bin counts can only dier in b∗ and b ′∗, but both
of them lead to the same output for each candidate matching, be-
cause they do not match any records in DA. Each secure pairwise
comparison satises (0, negl(κ))-DPRL, and since there are at most
n2 comparisons (recall κ > n = max(|DA |, |DB |)). us Step (b)
satises (0, negl(κ))-DPRL.
erefore, using similar arguments for Alice and sequential com-
position, we get that Algorithm 1 satises DPRL. 
Theorem 4.6. If Algorithm 1 (LP) takes η0 = ln2 n · ∆B/ϵ for
Eqn. (6), then LP satises (ϵA, ϵB ,o(1/nk ),o(1/nk ))-DPRL, for any
k > 0, where n = max(|DA |, |DB |).
Proof. (sketch) Taking η0 = ln2 n ·∆B/ϵ , the failing probability
δ = 1− (1− 1
nlnn (eϵ/∆B+1) )∆B ≤
c
nlnn
for some constant c (in terms
of ϵ,∆B). Hence δ = o(1/nk ) for all k > 0. 
LP only adds non-negative noise to the bin counts. One could
instead add noise that could take positive and negative values, and
suppress records if the noise is negative. We call this protocol LP-2.
is is indeed the protocol proposed by prior work [5, 19, 24] that
combined APC with DP blocking. However, we show that this
minor change in LP results in the protocol violating DPRL (even
though the noise addition seems to satisfy DP)! Hence, LP-2 also
does not satisfy IND- CDP-2PC (by eorem 3.9).
Theorem 4.7. For every non-negative ϵ,δ < p
∆B
2eϵ , there exists a
pair of neighboring databases for which LP-2 does not ensure (ϵ,δ )-
DPRL, where p = e
ϵ/∆B−1
eϵ/∆B+1 .
Proof. (sketch) e output of the record suppression step is
dependent on the ratio between the matching and non-matching
records in the bin. is introduces a correlation between the match-
ing and non-matching records. Consider a neighboring pair DB
and D ′B that dier by a non-matching pair (b∗,b ′∗) for a given DA.
If b∗ is in a bin full of non-matching records with DA, and b ′∗ is in a
bin full of matching records with DA (except b ′∗). DB is more likely
to output all matching pairs than D ′B if some record is suppressed.
e detailed proof can be found in Appendix B.1.2. 
4.2.4 Eiciency Analysis. Last, we present our result on the ef-
ciency of LP. Note that the communication and computational
costs for LP are the same as O(costBS ), where costBS is the num-
ber of candidate matches, if you consider the communication and
computational costs associated with a single secure comparison as
a constant. Hence, we analyze eciency in terms of the number of
candidate pairs costBS in LP.
Theorem 4.8. Given a blocking protocol B with k bins and block-
ing strategy BS , such that the number of candidate matches for DA
and DB , costBS (DA,DB ), is sub-quadratic in n, i.e. o(n2), where
n = max(|DA |, |DB |). If (1) the number of bins k is o(nc ) for c < 2,
and (2) each bin of a party is compared withO(1) number of bins from
the opposite party, then the expected number of candidate matches in
Algorithm 1 is sub-quadratic in n.
Proof. Given ϵ and δ , the expected number of dummy records
added per bin E(η+) is a constant denoted by cη (Def. 4.3). Each
bin of a party is compared with at most cb bins from the opposite
party, where cb is a constant. e number of candidate matches in
LP is a random variable, denoted by COST , with expected value
E(COST ) =
∑
(i, j)∈BS
E(|B˜i (DA)| |B˜j (DB )|)
=
∑
(i, j)∈BS
|Bi (DA)| |Bj (DB )| +
∑
(i, j)∈BS
E(η+i )E(η+j )
+
∑
(i, j)∈BS
(E(η+i )|Bj (DB )| + E(η+j )|Bi (DA)|)
< costBS (DA,DB ) + c2ηcbk + 2cηcbn.
Since costBS (DA,DB ) and k are sub-quadratic in n, E(COST ) is
also sub-quadratic in n. When δ is a negligible term as dened in
eorem 4.6, the noise per bin is O(ln2 n). As k is o(nc ) for c < 2,
the expected value of COST is still sub-quadratic in n. 
Conditions (1) and (2) in the above theorem are satised by, for
instance, sorted neighborhood, and distance based blocking [6] (we
use the laer in our experiments). While the asymptotic complexity
of LP is sub-quadratic, it performs at least a constant number of
secure comparisons for each pair (i, j) ∈ BS even if there are no real
records in Bi (DA) and Bj (DB ). We can reduce this computational
overhead with a slight loss in recall (with no loss in privacy) using
a heuristic we describe in the next section.
4.3 Sort & Prune BS (SP)
Algorithm 1 draws noise from the same distribution for each bin,
and hence the expected number of dummy records is the same
for every bin. e bins with higher noisy counts will then have a
higher ratio of true to dummy records. is motivates us to match
candidate pairs in bins with high noisy counts rst. Instead of
comparing bin pairs in BS in a random or index order, we would
like to sort them based on the noisy counts of B˜(DA) and B˜(DB ).
Given a list of descending thresholds t¯ = [t1, t2, t3 . . .], the pairs
of bins from the matching strategy BS can be sorted into groups
denoted by BS,tl for l = 1, 2, . . ., where
BS,tl = {|B˜i (DA)| > tl ∧ |B˜j (DB )| > tl |(i, j) ∈ BS }.
Each group consists of bin pairs from BS with both noisy counts
greater than the threshold.
We let the thresholds t¯ be the deciles of the sorted noisy bin sizes
of B˜(DA) and B˜(DB ). As the threshold decreases, the likelihood
of matching true records instead of dummy records drops for bins.
Alice and Bob can stop this matching process before reaching the
smallest threshold in t¯ . If the protocol stops at a larger threshold,
the recall is smaller. In the evaluation, if the protocol stops at 10%
percentile of the noisy bin counts, the recall can reach more than
0.95. is allows a trade-o between recall and eciency for a given
privacy guarantee. We show that this step also ensures DPRL.
Corollary 4.9. Algorithm 1 with sort & prune step (SP) satises
(ϵA, ϵB ,δA,δB )-DPRL.
Proof. Similar to the proof in eorem 4.5, Alice with input
data DA has a view consisting of (1) the number of candidate match-
ing pairs arising in each (i, j) ∈ BS , and (2) the output for each
candidate matching pair. As SP is a post-processing step based on
the noisy bin counts, which is part of Alice’s original view, the over-
all protocol still satises the same DPRL guarantee by eorem 3.5
(post-processing). 
We next present an optimization that also uses a form of post-
processing to signicantly reduce the number of secure pairwise
comparisons in practice, but whose privacy analysis is more in-
volved than that of SP.
4.4 Greedy Match & Clean (GMC)
LP executes a sequence of secure comparison protocols, one per
candidate pair. Aer every comparison (or a block of comparisons),
Alice and Bob learn a subset of the matchesO . Based on the current
output O , Alice and Bob can greedily search matching pairs in the
clear from their respective databases (Lines 5,10 in Algorithm 3),
and add the new matching pairs to the output set O until no new
matching pairs can be found. In addition, Alice and Bob can remove
records in the output from the bins B˜(DA) and B˜(DB ) to further
reduce the number of secure pairwise comparisons (Lines 4,9). We
can see that this optimization step is not simply post-processing,
Algorithm 3: Greedy match and clean
Input :O , B˜(DA), B˜(DB )
1 repeat
2 // Alice performs the following:
3 OA ← piAO , OB ← piBO ;
4 B˜(DA) ← B˜(DA) −OA ;
5 O ′ ← PlainMatch(OB, B˜(DA)) ;
6 Add O ′ to O and send O to Bob ;
7 // Bob performs the following:
8 OA ← piAO , OB ← piBO ;
9 B˜(DB ) ← B˜(DB ) −OB ;
10 O ′ ← PlainMatch(OA, B˜(DB )) ;
11 Add O ′ to O and send O to Alice ;
12 until O received by Alice has no updates;
because it makes use of the true record in plain text for matching.
In traditional dierential privacy, when the true data is used for
computation, the privacy guarantee decays. However, we show
that this is not true for the GMC step in the seing of DPRL.
Theorem 4.10. Algorithm 1 with the greedy match & clean step
(GMC) in Algorithm 3 satises (ϵA, ϵB ,δA,δB )-DPRL.
Proof. First consider the privacy for Bob. Alice with input data
DA, has a view consisting of (1) the number of candidate matching
pairs arising in each (i, j) ∈ BS , (2) the output for each candidate
matching pair, (3) the output from plaintext comparisons with
output records.
Consider a neighboring pair (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N (f1m (DA, ·)) for a
given DA. By eorem 3.6, DB and D ′B dier in only one non-
matching record with respect to DA, i.e. D ′B = DB − b∗ + b ′∗ and
b∗ , b ′∗, where m(b∗,a) = 0 and m(b ′∗,a) = 0 for all a ∈ DA. DB
and D ′B can dier by at most ∆B in their bin counts. Similar to the
proof for eorem 4.5, the rst step of the protocol adds dummy
records to bins, and satises (ϵB ,δB )-DPRL.
In the second step, given a xed view VIEW∗ from the rst step
which consists of the noisy bin counts and encrypted records from
B˜(DB ), Alice’s view regarding the output for each candidate match-
ing pair (a,b) is the same regardless (a,b) are compared securely
or in plaintext. Alice’s view regarding the output from plaintext
comparisons with the records in the output set is also the same
for a xed VIEW∗ from the rst step. e encrypted records for
a given noisy bin counts can only dier in b∗ and b ′∗, and they
will never be pruned away. Both of them also lead to the same
output for secure pairwise comparisons or plaintext comparisons,
because they do not match any records inDA. us Step (b) satises
(0, negl(κ)-DPRL.
erefore, using similar arguments for Alice and sequential com-
position, we get that Algorithm 1 satises DPRL. 
With the same privacy guarantee, LP with the GMC step can
even improve the eciency of LP without sacricing recall.
Theorem 4.11. LP with the greedy match & clean step (GMC)
performs no more secure pairwise comparisons than LP, and outputs
at least as many matching pairs as LP.
We refer the reader to Appendix B.3.2 for the proof. Both SP and
GMC are also applicable on the local DP based protocols for the
similar reasoning. Hence, we will only show how each optimization
helps improve the eciency of the basic LP in the evaluation.
5 EVALUATION
We empirically evaluate the correctness, privacy, and eciency of
the protocols proposed in § 4. Our experiments demonstrate the
following results:
• e Laplace Protocol (LP, which includes all the optimizations)
proposed in § 4 is over 2 orders of magnitude more ecient
than the baseline approaches while still achieving a high recall
and end-to-end privacy. (§ 5.2.1)
• At any given level of privacy, LP incurs a computational cost
that is near linear in the input database size. (§ 5.2.1)
• Greedy match & clean and Sort & prune optimization help
reduce communication and computation costs. e former
results in 50% lower cost than unoptimized LP in some cases.
(§ 5.2.2)
• We explore the 3-way trade-os between correctness, privacy,
and eciency of LP. (§ 5.2.3)
5.1 Evaluation Setup
5.1.1 Datasets andMatching Rules. Taxi dataset (Taxi): To simu-
late linkage in the location domain, we extract location distribution
information from the TLC Trip Record Data [37]. Each record
includes a pickup location in latitude-longitude coordinates (trun-
cated to 6 decimal places) and the date and hour of the pickup
time. Taking the original dataset as DA, we create DB by perturb-
ing the latitude-longitude coordinates of each record in DA with
random values uniformly drawn from [−θ ,+θ ]2, where θ = 0.001.
Each day has approximately 300,000 pickups. e data size can be
scaled up by increasing the number of days,T . We experiment with
T = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, with T = 1 being the default. Any pair of records
a,b ∈ Σ are called a match if they have the same day and hour, and
their Euclidean distance in location is no larger than θ . e location
domain is within the bounding box (40.711720N, 73.929670W) and
(40.786770N, 74.006600W). We project the locations into a uniform
grid of 16 × 16 cells with size 0.005 × 0.005. A blocking strategy
BS based on the pickup time and grid is applied to both datasets,
resulting in (16× 16× 24T ) bins. BS compares pairs of bins that are
associated with the same hour, and corresponding/neighboring grid
cells. us, each bin in B(DA) is compared with 9 bins in B(DB ).
Abt and Buy product dataset (AB): ese datasets are synthesized
from the online retailers Abt.com and Buy.com [23] who would like
to collaboratively study the common products they sell as a function
of time. Each record in either dataset consists of a product name,
brand and the day the product was sold. e product names are
tokenized into trigrams, and hashed into a bit vector with a bloom
lter having domain Σ = {0, 1}50. We consider 16 brands, and
sample 5,000 records per day from the original datasets for Abt and
Buy each. e data size can be scaled up withT forT = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16,
with 1 being the default for T . Any pair of records a,b ∈ Σ are
called a match if (a) they are sold on the same day, (b) they are of the
same brand, and (c) the hamming distance between their vectorized
●
●
●
●
●
8
10
12
14
5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75
log(n)
log
(c
os
t)
Taxi:recall=1.0
●
●
●
●
●
6
8
10
12
4.0 4.5
log(n)
log
(c
os
t)
AB:recall=1.0
eps ● PSI+X APC LP,eps=0.1 LP,eps=0.4 LP,eps=1.6 np
Figure 2: e average log (cost) of LP, APC, PSI+X and
non-private matching (np) for the Taxi and AB datasets vs
log (data size). LP give lower costs than the baselines PSI+X
and APC for all values of ϵ = 0.1, 0.4, 1.6 and δ = 10−5, and
scales near linearly.
names is no more than θ = 5. A blocking strategy hashes records
having the same value for day and brand into the same bin, resulting
in 16T bins, and compares records falling in the corresponding bins.
5.1.2 Protocols: We evaluate four DPRL protocols: (1) Laplace
protocol (LP), (2) all-pairwise comparisons (APC), (3) private set
intersection (PSI), and (4) PSI with expansion (PSI+X). e default
LP consists of the basic protocol described in Algorithm 1 along
with optimization steps (SP and GMC) in § 4.3 and 4.4.
5.1.3 Metrics: ere are three dimensions in the trade-o space:
correctness, privacy and eciency. e correctness of a protocol is
measured by the recall, which is the fraction of the matching pairs
output by the algorithm, as dened in Eqn. (1), with larger values
close to 1 being beer. e privacy metric is specied in advance for
each algorithm using parameters ϵ,δ . For AP, PSI, and PSI+X, ϵ = 0
and δ = negl(κ) by eorem 3.8. We consider ϵA = ϵB = ϵ and
δA = δB for ϵ ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 1.6} and δ ∈ {10−9, 10−7, 10−5} for LP.
e default value for ϵ and δ is 1.6 and 10−5, respectively. Finally,
we dene eciency of APC and LP protocols for a given dataset
as the number of secure pairwise comparisons, and denote this
by cost. e cost of PSI and PSI+X can be estimated as γn ln ln(n),
where γ is the expansion factor, or the ratio of sizes of the expanded
and true databases. is represents the number of operations on
encrypted values. For PSI, γ is 1. We use the number of secure com-
parison/operations on encrypted values rather than the wallclock
times as a measure of eciency, since these operations dominate
the total time. We discuss wallclock times in more detail in § 5.2.4.
5.2 Results and Discussions
5.2.1 Eiciency and scalability. In this section, we empirically in-
vestigate how LP scales as the data size increases (T ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 16})
in comparison to baselines APC and PSI+X, when all the algorithms
achieve 100% recall. We do not include PSI as its recall is close to
10%. LP is evaluated at privacy parameter ϵ ∈ {1.6, 0.4, 0.1} and
xed δ = 10−5. At each ϵ , we report the average number of candi-
date pairs for LP over 10 runs for each value of T . To achieve 100%
recall, PSI+X expands each record b in DB to every other record b ′
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Figure 3: e average cost with standard deviation of LP protocols with ve settings: (1) ‘basic’ – the basic LP protocol in
Algorithm 1, (2) ‘basic+SP’ – the basic LP with sort & prune step in § 4.3, (3) ‘basic+GMC’ – the basic protocol with greedy
match & clean step in Algorithm 3, (4) ‘basic+GMC+S’ – the previous protocol with addition sorting step described in § 4.3, and
(5) ‘basic+GMC+SP’ – the protocol stops at recall less than full recall.
within a θ -ball around b. We add 2,369,936 records per record in
the AB dataset, and 10002pi records per record in the Taxi dataset.
In Figure 2, we report the log(base 10) value of the average cost,
log(cost), with respect to the log value of data size log(n) for PSI+X,
APC, and LP with varying ϵ and the non-private seing (np) when
they achieve a recall of 1.0. Results for Taxi are shown on the
le, and AB are shown on the right. For both datasets, the baseline
methods, PSI+X and APC, have data points and line segments above
LP for the ploed data size range. When the Taxi dataset has a
size of 105.5, LP at ϵ = 0.1 costs an order of magnitude less than
APC, as shown by the lemost brown point (APC) and blue point
(LP,eps=0.1) in Figure 2(le). As the data size increases, the gap
between APC and LP gets larger. When data size increases by 16
times (the right most points in the plots), LP at ϵ = 0.1 costs over 2
orders of magnitude less than APC. When ϵ increases, the cost of
LP shis downward towards the non-private seing (np). When
ϵ = 1.6, LP has 3 orders of magnitude lower cost than APC for
the given range of data sizes. e line for np is the lower bound
for LP, where no dummy records are added to the bins. Similar
observations are found in Figure 2(right) for the AB dataset, where
LP improves APC by up to 2 orders for the ploed data size range.
PSI+X has a much larger cost than both APC and LP, mainly due
to the fact that the expansion factor is far larger than the data size.
We also observe that the lines that pass through the points of APC
for both Taxi and AB datasets have a slope of 2, which corresponds
to the quadratic communication and computational cost of APC. LP
and PSI+X have slopes of values slightly larger than 1, and thus are
linear time. us, for suciently large data sizes, PSI+X can beat
APC. However, we do not expect PSI+X to beat LP due to the large
expansion factor. Similar results are observed when the protocol
stops before achieving full recall (Figure 5 in Appendix D).
5.2.2 Optimization steps. We next study the eectiveness of
the optimization steps for LP. We study 5 protocols as shown be-
low:
• ‘basic’: the basic LP Algorithm 1 with no heuristic optimiza-
tions;
• ‘basic+SP’: the basic LP with the sort & prune step (SP). SP stops
the protocol when the threshold reaches the 10% percentile of
the noisy bin counts of B˜(DA) and B˜(DB ). Together with the
sorting step, bins pairs with insucient counts can be pruned
away, resulting in a recall slightly smaller than the highest
possible recall;
• ‘basic+GMC’: the greedy match & clean step (GMC) in Algo-
rithm 3 is applied to the basic LP;
• ‘basic+GMC+S’: in addition to the previous protocol, bins are
sorted in order of size. Pruning is omied so that the highest
possible recall is achieved;
• ‘basic+GMC+SP’: the same protocol as ‘basic+GMC+S’, except
it prunes the bins with counts in the boom 10% percentile.
Hence, the default LP can be also denoted by ‘basic+GMC+S’ if
recall is 1.0 and ‘basic+GMC+SP’ if recall is less than 1.0.
In Figure 3, we report the average cost with the standard de-
viation across 10 runs of the above mentioned protocols at ϵ =
0.1, 0.4, 1.6 and δ = 10−5 for the Taxi and AB datasets when T = 1
and T = 16. Several interesting observations arise from this plot.
First, the most signicant drop in cost is due to GMC. e pro-
tocols with the greedy step have smaller cost than other protocols
for all ϵ and datasets. For the Taxi datasets at T = 1 or T = 16,
‘basic+GMC’ saves the cost of ‘basic’ by over 50% when ϵ = 1.6.
As ϵ decreases, these relative savings reduce because more dummy
records are added and cannot be matched or removed by this greedy
step. For the AB datasets, ‘basic+GMC’ reduces the cost of ‘basic’
by up to 16% at ϵ = 1.6 and 11% at ϵ = 0.1.
Next, adding the sorting step to GMC (GMC +S) improves upon
GMC when the data sizes are large (T=16). For instance, when
ϵ = 0.1 andT = 16, ‘basic+GMC+S’ can further bring the cost down
by approximately 8.0× 106 candidate pairs for the AB datasets, and
by 2.0 × 109 for the Taxi datasets.
ird, the cost of ‘basic+GMC+SP’ is reported at a recall reach-
ing above 0.95. e reduction with respect to ‘basic+GMC+S’ is
relatively small, but the absolute reduction in cost is signicant in
some seing. For instance, the number of candidate pairs is reduced
by 5.0 × 106 for the AB datasets when ϵ = 0.1 and T = 16.
Last, for the AB dataset at T = 16, ‘basic+SP’ has a smaller
variance in cost than ‘basic’ at ϵ = 0.1. Similarly, ‘basic+GMC+SP’
has a smaller variance in cost than ‘basic+GMC’. is implies the
sort & prune step can help prune away bins, and hence reduce the
variance introduced by dummy records.
5.2.3 Three-way trade-os. All the DPRL baseline methods in-
cluding APC, PSI and PSI+X, have a xed and strong privacy guar-
antee where ϵ = 0 and δ = negl(κ). Hence, each baseline has a
single point in a plot between recall and eciency for a given data
size, where APC and PSI+X have a point with full recall and high
cost, and PSI has a point with low recall and low cost. Here, we
will show that LP allows a trade-o between recall and eciency
for a given privacy guarantee. e eciency metric used here is
the ratio of the cost(LP) to the cost(APC).
Figure 4(a) illustrates the case when both Alice and Bob require
(ϵ,δ )-DPRL protection where ϵ = {0.1, 0.4, 1.6} and xed δ = 10−5.
In Figure 4(b), we vary the values of δ for δ ∈ {10−9, 10−7, 10−5}
with xed ϵ = 1.6. Each data point in the plot corresponds to the
average cost(LP)/cost(APC) and average recall of the default LP
for a given (ϵ,δ ) and the default data size with T = 1. e default
LP allows the sort & prune step as described in § 4.3 with a list of
thresholds that are the 90%, 80%, …, 0% percentiles of the sorted
bin sizes of B˜(DA) and B˜(DB ). We report the average recall and
cost(LP)/cost(APC) for each percentile. is gives a trade-o line
for each ϵ and δ value.
We observe that all the trade-o lines obtain a high recall at
very small values of cost(LP)/cost(APC). Even at ϵ = 0.1, LP incurs
100 times smaller cost than APC. LP has a slightly larger cost for
AB dataset. In Figure 4(a), the trade-o lines between recall and
eciency shi rightwards as the privacy parameter ϵ gets smaller.
In other words, the cost is higher for a stronger privacy guarantee
in order to output the same recall. Similar observations are found
in Figure 4(b). However, the trade-o lines are more sensitive to ϵ
than δ . e red lines in Figure 4(a) and the red lines in Figure 4(b)
correspond to the same privacy seing. As δ reduces by 10000 times
from 10−5 to 10−9, the trade-o line of LP for the Taxi datasets shis
the ratio of costs by at most 0.001 as shown in Figure 4(b) (le) while
the trade-o line increases the ratio of costs to 0.07 as ϵ reduces
from 1.6 to 0.1 (Figure 4(a)).
As the Taxi and AB dataset have dierent data distributions over
bins, the shapes of the trade-o lines are dierent. AB datasets are
more skewed and have some bins with large counts. ese bins
also have many matching pairs, and hence we see a steep rise for
the rst part of the trade-o lines for the AB datasets. When the
data size increases, if the distribution of matching pairs remains
similar, the trade-o lines between the eciency and recall tends
to stay the same. ese trade-o lines can be useful when choosing
the recall, privacy and eciency for larger datasets.
5.2.4 Wall clock times. We implemented APC and LP in python,
and implemented operations on encrypted records using the Pail-
lier homomorphic cryptosystem using the python-paillier library
[38]. As all algorithms require a one-time encryption of records we
exclude this cost and only measure the cost of operations on the
encrypted records. On a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 machine with 16 GB
RAM, we found that computing the Hamming distance of two en-
crypted records with dimension d = 50 takes an average of ts = 77
ms. at is, for datasets of size n = 5000, APC would take over 22
days to complete! Additionally, for the same dataset with ϵ = 1.6,
LP would only take 80 hours to achieve a recall of 1. In comparison,
the wall clock time of LP ignoring the time spent in comparisons of
encrypted records was only 120 seconds. We believe that this order
of magnitude dierence in time for secure operations and normal
operations is true independent of the library or protocol used for
secure comparisons. us, the computational cost of LP is domi-
nated by the cost of secure comparison. How to improve the unit
cost of each secure pairwise comparison is an important research
topic, and is orthogonal to our research. Hence, in this evaluation,
we focused only on the number of secure comparisons/operations
on encrypted values to measure eciency.
6 RELATEDWORK
In addition to the prior work [5, 19, 24] that aempted to combine
DP and secure computation techniques in order to scale-up the
PRL problem, there are other eorts that take similar approaches,
but focus on solving dierent problems. Wagh et al. [39] formal-
ized the notion of dierentially private oblivious RAM (DP ORAM)
and their corresponding protocols signicantly improved the band-
width overheads with a relaxed privacy guarantee. is privacy
notion considers a client-server model where all data sit on a single
server, while DPRL considers two party computation. Moreover,
the protocols for DP ORAM only consider the trade-o between
privacy and eciency while DPRL considers an additional trade-
o dimension: correctness. Several eorts [2, 16, 26, 27, 30, 31]
also integrated DP with SMC in a distributed seing where data
is vertically or horizontally partitioned between parties. e dif-
ference is that these papers focus on aggregate functions over the
partitioned data, such as join size, marginal counts and sum, while
PRL requires matching individual record pairs. is matching of
individual record pairs does not naturally compose with DP, and
hence motivated DPRL, a new privacy model for ecient PRL.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a novel privacy model, called output
constrained dierential privacy, that shares the strong privacy pro-
tection of dierential privacy, but allows for the truthful release
of the output of a certain function on the data. We showed that
this new privacy model can be applied to record linkage to dene
dierential privacy for record linkage (DPRL). Under this frame-
work, we proposed novel protocols for ecient PRL that satisfy
three desiderata: correctness, privacy and eciency. is is an
important advance, since none of the prior techniques achieves
all three desiderata. Despite this advance, further investigation
into the practicality of DPRL protocols is a direction for future
research. is includes investigation into their wall clock times in
a specic operational environment and over datasets with more
complex matching functions. Additional directions for future re-
search include identifying DPRL protocols that further reduce the
computational complexity of record linkage, such as applying a
data-dependent blocking strategy, extending two-party DPRL to
a multi-party seing, and generalizing the notion of output con-
strained dierential privacy to other applications beyond private
record linkage.
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A RELATED PRIVACY DEFINITIONS
A.1 Simulation-Based S2PC
e standard simulation-based denition for SMC is dened below.
Denition A.1 (SIM-S2PC). [15] For a functionality f , a 2-party
protocol Π which computes f provides simulation-based secure
2-party computation (SIM-S2PC) if for all data sets DA, DB of poly-
nomial sizes (in κ), there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithms (simulators), denoted by SA and SB such that the distribution
of SA (resp., SB ) is computationally indistinguishable from VIEWΠA
(resp., VIEWΠB ), i.e. for any probabilistic polynomial-time (in κ)
adversary T ,
Pr [T (SA(DA, fA(DA,DB ), f (DA,DB ))) = 1] (7)
≤ Pr [T (VIEWΠA(DA,DB ),OΠ(DA,DB )) = 1] + negl(κ)
Pr [T (SB (DA, fB (DA,DB ), f (DA,DB ))) = 1] (8)
≤ Pr [T (VIEWΠB (DA,DB ),OΠ(DA,DB )) = 1] + negl(κ).
If f is deterministic, Alice gains no additional knowledge other
than its respective input (DA) and output (fA(DA,DB )); similarly
for Bob. When randomized functionalities are concerned, augment-
ing the view of the semi-honest party by the output of the other
party is essential. In this case, for any protocol Π that computes
the randomized functionality f , it does not necessarily hold that
OΠ(DA,DB ) = f (DA,DB ). Rather, these two random variables
must be identically distributed. In order to study the possibility of
composing DP and S2PC, we choose the indistinguishability-based
denition for PRL, which is implied from SIM-S2PC.
Theorem A.2. SIM-S2PC implies IND-S2PC.
Proof. Given the protocol Π, for all possible inputs (DA,DB ),
there exists a global simulator SA such that the distribution of SA
is computationally indistinguishable from the view of Alice. As
f (DA,DB ) = f (DA,D ′B ), SA takes the same input and hence will
have the same distribution for DB and D ′B . Hence, the views over(DA,DB ) or (DA,D ′B ) are indistinguishable. 
Any algorithm that satises SIM-CDP also satises IND-CDP
[25], but it is unknown if the converse holds.
A.2 Computationally Dierential Privacy
Mironov et al. [25] denes a privacy notion, known as indistinguish-
able computationally dierential privacy (IND-CDP-2PC). is no-
tion is a direct extension of DP in two party seing where both
parties are computationally bounded. Formally, we have
Denition A.3 (IND-CDP-2PC). A 2-party protocol Π for com-
puting function f satises (ϵA(κ), ϵB (κ))-indistinguishable com-
putationally dierential privacy (IND-CDP-2PC) if VIEWΠA(DA, ·)
satises ϵB (κ)-IND-CDP, i.e. for any probabilistic polynomial-time
(inκ) adversaryT , for any neighboring databases (DB ,D ′B ) diering
in a single row,
Pr [T (VIEWΠA(DA,DB )) = 1]
≤ eϵBPr [T (VIEWΠA(DA,D ′B )) = 1] + negl(κ). (9)
e same holds for Bob’s view for any neighbors (DA,D ′A) and ϵA.
A.3 Local Dierential Privacy
e local model is usually considered in the model where individ-
uals do not trust the curator with their data. e local version of
dierential privacy is dened as follows.
Denition A.4 (ϵ-Local Dierential Privacy). [11] A randomized
mechanism M : Σ→ O satises ϵ-local dierential privacy if
Pr[M(r ) = O] ≤ eϵ Pr[M(r ′) = O] (10)
for any set O ⊆ O, and any records r , r ′ ∈ Σ and ϵ > 0.
B THEOREMS & PROOFS
B.1 Privacy Leakage in Prior Work
B.1.1 Theorem 2.4 (Limitations of PRL with Blocking). Given
(d1,d2,p1,p2)-sensitiveH = {h0, ..,h |H |−1}, we useH (·) for a record
to denote the list of hashing values [h0(·), . . . ,h |H |−1(·)]. An LSH-
based blocking considers a set of bins where records associated
with the same value for H (·) are hashed to the same bin. A popular
blocking strategy is to compare all the corresponding bins, and
results in a set of candidate matches {(a,b)|h(a) = h(b)∀h ∈ H ,a ∈
DA,b ∈ DB }, i.e. {(a,b)|H (a) = H (b),∀a ∈ DA,b ∈ DB }. We can
show that any LSH based blocking cannot satisfy IND-S2PC as
stated in eorem 2.4. Here is the proof.
Proof. Take a pair of databases (DB ,D ′B )where f1m (DA,DB ) =
f1m (DA,D ′B ). Let the symmetric dierence between DB and D ′B
be (b,b ′) and dist(b,b ′) > d2. Hence, with high probability 1−p |H |2 ,
we have H (b) , H (b ′), and |BH (b)(DB )| − |BH (b)(D ′B )| = 1 and|BH (b′)(D ′B )| − |BH (b′)(DB )| = 1 as the rest of records are the same
in DB and D ′B . Alice as a semi-honest adversary can set her dataset
such that |BH (b)(DA)| , |BH (b′)(DA)|. en, with high probability,
the following inequality holds
costBS (DA,DB ) − costBS (DA,D ′B )
= (|BH (b)(DB )| − |BH (b)(D ′B )|)|BH (b)(DA)|
+(|BH (b′)(DB )| − |BH (b′)(D ′B )|)|BH (b′)(DA)|
= |BH (b)(DA)| − |BH (b′)(DA)| , 0. (11)
Hence, Alice can distinguish DB and D ′B by costBS (DA,DB ) ,
costBS (DA,D ′B ) with high probability 1 − p
|H |
2 . Other blocking
strategies can be similarly shown. erefore, this LSH-based PRL
does not satisfy IND-S2PC. 
B.1.2 Theorem 4.7 (Limitations of PRL with DP Blocking of Prior
Approaches/LP-2). Several prior works [5, 19, 24] combine PRL tech-
niques with dierentially private blocking (PRL +BDP ). ese
approaches can be summarized in three steps: (1) DP blocking,
(2) records addition and suppression, (3) secure pair-wise com-
parisons based on blocking strategy BS . In the rst step, Alice
and Bob process their data independently. Each party generates
an ϵ-dierentially private partition of the data, where each parti-
tion is associated with a noisy count o˜i = |Bi (DB )| + ηi , where
Pr[ηi = x] = pe−ϵ/∆B· |x | , for x ∈ Z and p = eϵ/∆B−1eϵ/∆B+1 is the nor-
malized factor 2. ∆B is the sensitivity of the blocking strategy
(Def 4.2).
Next, for each partition, if the noiseηi is positive, dummy records
are added; otherwise, records in that partition are suppressed ran-
domly to obtain the published count. is results in new bins,
denoted by {B˜i (DA)} and {B˜j (DB )}. In the last step, Alice and
Bob jointly compare record pairs (a,b), where a ∈ B˜i (DA) and
b ∈ B˜j (DB ) for all (i, j) ∈ BS as in APC. ey only exchange the
true records (a,b) if they match. [5] considers a third party for
identifying candidate pairs for Alice and Bob, so that Alice and
Bob has no direct access to the noisy bins of the opposite party,
but has access to the number of secure comparisons. However,
this hybrid protocol above does not satisfy (ϵ,δ )-DPRL as stated
in eorem 4.7. e failure to satisfy DPRL is mainly caused by
the record suppression step for the negative noise drawn from a
zero-mean Laplace distribution, as shown in the following proof.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider Alice as the
adversary. For any arbitrary ϵ and small δ < p
∆B
2eϵ , there exists a
counter example fails (ϵ,δ )-DPRL. For simplicity, we illustrate how
to construct counterexamples using a blocking strategy B with
sensitivity ∆B = 2, where Alice and Bob use the same hashing and
each record is hashed to at most 1 bin. For other blocking strategies,
counterexamples can be similarly constructed.
Fix a DA, consider DB such that B0(DB ) = {b∗} and B1(DB ) =
{b1, ..,bn1 }, where 1 ≤ n1 < p
2
eϵ δ−1 . (Note that
p2
eϵ δ > 2 because
δ <
p2
2eϵ .) In addition, all records in B1(DB ) can nd some match-
ing ones from DA, but b∗ does not match any record in DA. A
neighboring database D ′B can be constructed from DB by removing
b∗ from B0, and adding another b ′∗ that can be hashed to B1. It is
easy to see that (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N(f1m (DA, ·)).
Without a third party [19, 24], Alice and Bob has access to the
number of secure comparisons and the noisy bin counts (in addition
to the input data sizes and the matching output). Consider a set of
views of Alice VIEW∗ with output that contains all matching pairs
from B1(DA) 1m B1(DB ) and noisy counts for bin B0 and B1 for
Bob being 0 and n1 respectively. Let B˜(DA) be the noisy bins that
Alice uses for the nal secure pairwise comparisons. e probabili-
ties to generate these views from DB and D ′B are respectively:
Pr[VIEW∗ |B˜(DA),DB ] = Pr[η0 = 0] Pr[η1 = 0] = p2, (12)
Pr[VIEW∗ |B˜(DA),D ′B ] = Pr[η0 = 1] Pr[η1 = −1& suppress b ′∗]
= p2/(eϵ (n1 + 1)) > δ (13)
e inequality above is due to n1 < p
2
eϵ δ − 1. Hence, we have
Pr[VIEW∗ |B˜(DA),DB ] = (eϵ + n1eϵ ) Pr[VIEW∗ |B˜(DA),D ′B ]
> eϵ Pr[VIEW∗ |B˜(DA),D ′B ] + δ . (14)
Hence, (ϵ,δ )-DPRL is violated.
With a third party[5], Alice and Bob has access to the nal out-
put, and the total number of secure pairwise comparisons, but not
the noisy bin counts. We can construct examples where know-
ing the number of secure comparisons leaks the noisy bin counts.
2We use discrete version of Laplace distribution to avoid rounding.
Aer which the previous arguments (for the case with no third
party) can show that this protocol does not ensure DPRL for all
epsilon and delta. For instance, consider Alice has only 1 record
in B˜0(DA), and more than 1 records in other bins, if the output
O = DA 1m DB , and the total number of secure pairwise compar-
isons is |O | + 1. is secure pairwise matching that returns false
can only happen between a record of Bob from B˜0(DB ) with the
record from B˜0(DA). Hence, Alice can infer the noisy counts of
B˜(DB ). en the argument for the case with no third party can be
used. 
In addition, by eorem 3.8 and eorem 3.9, DPRL is weaker
than IND-S2PC and IND-CDP-2PC, we have the following result.
Corollary B.1. LP-2 satises neither IND-CDP-2PC nor IND-
S2PC.
B.2 Properties of Output Constrained DP
B.2.1 Theorem 3.4 (Sequential Composition).
Proof. Consider Alice as a probabilistic polynomial-time (in κ)
adversary T , with input DA. (DB ,D ′B ) are neighbors w.r.t. f (DA, ·).
We have the probabilities of distinguishing DB and D ′B bounded by
Pr[T (VIEWΠ2,Π1A (DA,DB )) = 1]
≤
∫
x
Pr[T (VIEWΠ2A (DA,DB ,x)) = 1] ·
Pr[x = VIEWΠ1A (DA,DB )]dx
≤
∫
x
(eϵ2 Pr[T (VIEWΠ2A (DA,D ′B ,x)) = 1] + δ2) ·
Pr[x = VIEWΠ1A (DA,DB )]dx
≤
∫
x
(eϵ2 Pr[T (VIEWΠ2A (DA,D ′B ,x)) = 1]) ·
(eϵ1Pr [x = VIEWΠ1A (DA,D ′B )] + δ1)dx + δ2
≤ eϵ1+ϵ2 Pr[T (VIEWΠ2,Π1A (DA,D ′B )) = 1] + δ1 + δ2

B.2.2 Theorem 3.5 (Post-processing).
Proof. Since д is ecient and in composition with T can be
used as adversary itself. If д(OΠ(DA,DB )) does not satisfy (ϵ,δ )-
IND-DPRL, then Π does not satisfy (ϵ,δ )-IND-DPRL. 
B.2.3 Theorem 3.9 (Relation with IND-CDP-2PC). We show that
DPRL is weaker than IND-CDP-2PC.
Proof. ϵ/2-IND-CDP-2PC is equivalent to ϵ-IND-DP-2PC, where
neighboring databases have a symmetric dierence of 2. e set of
neighboring databases for DPRL is a subset of that for ϵ-IND-DP-
2PC, and hence (ϵ,δ )-DPRL is weaker than ϵ/2-IND-DP-2PC. 
B.3 Properties for DPRL Protocols
B.3.1 Theorem 4.5 (Privacy of Laplace Protocol).
Lemma B.2. With probability 1−δ , the probability for Alice having
the same view from neighboring databases (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N(f1m (DA, ·))
is bounded by eϵ .
Proof. Given (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N(f1m (DA, ·)) and B, the maximum
dierence in the bin counts of DB and D ′B is ∆B. Let B∆ be the set
of bins thatDB andD ′B have dierent counts, and
∑
i ∈B∆ |Bi (DB )−
Bi (D ′B )| ≤ ∆B. If all the noise for these bins are non-negative, then
the probability to output the same noisy counts (c0, . . . , ck−1) from
DB and D ′B is bounded by
ln(Pr[(c0, . . . , ck−1 |DB ]Pr[(c0, . . . , ck−1 |D ′B ]
)
= ln(
∏k−1
i=0 Pr[ηi = ci − |Bi (DB )|]∏k−1
i=0 Pr[ηi = ci − |Bi (D ′B )|]
)
=
∑
i ∈B∆
ln(Pr[ηi = ci − |Bi (DB )|]) − ln(Pr[ηi = ci − |Bi (D ′B )|])
≤ ϵ/∆B · (
∑
i ∈B∆
|Bi (DB ) − Bi (D ′B )|) ≤ ϵ
e probability to draw a negative noise η from Lap(ϵ,δ ,∆B) is
Pr [η < 0] =
−∞∑
i=−1
p · e−(ϵ/∆B)(x−η0) = e
−η0ϵ/∆B
eϵ/∆B + 1
(15)
Given η0 = −∆B ln((e
ϵ/∆B+1)(1−(1−δ )1/∆B ))
ϵ , we have Pr [η < 0] =
1 − (1 − δ )1/∆B . For each neighboring pair, at most ∆B bins dier
and fail to have Pr [η ≥ 0]. Hence, the overall failing probability is
1− (1−Pr [η < 0])∆B = δ . With 1−δ , the probability of having the
same view from PRL neighboring databases is bounded by eϵ . 
B.3.2 Theorem 4.11 (Correctness & Eiciency of GMC).
Proof. First, we will show that the eciency of LP with the
greedy match & clean step (GMC) is beer than LP alone. e
rst part of the protocol that adds dummy records is the same.
e second part of the protocol without GMC compares all the
candidate matches using the secure matching protocol SMC(a,b).
On the other hand, with GMC, if a record pair (a,b) is compared
securely, then (a,b) must be one of the candidate matches. Hence,
the number of the secure pairwise comparisons with GMC will be
no more than the protocol without GMC.
Next, we will show the correctness of LP with GMC. LetOLP ,OLP+GMC
be the nal output of LP protocol without GMC and with GMC. We
would like to show that if (a,b) ∈ OLP , then (a,b) ∈ OLP,GMC . Sup-
pose this is not true, then there exists a matching pair (a,b) ∈ OLP ,
but (a,b) < OLP+GMC . If so, then one of the records in (a,b) must
be removed from the bins before its turn of secure pairwise compari-
son SMC(a,b). Without loss of generality, let’s say a is cleaned from
Alice’s bins before SMC(a,b). e condition to remove a is that a
has already been in the current output. Hence, Bob is able to com-
pare a with all his records in plain text and identify this matching
pair (a,b). is leads to a contradiction. Hence, OLP ⊆ OLP+GMC .
Moreover, if a matching pair (a,b) is not a candidate match based on
the blocking strategy BS , and if a has been already found matching
with another record of Bob, then GMC can add (a,b) intoOLP+GMC .
Hence, it is possible that LP with GMC gains even more matching
pairs than LP alone. 
Algorithm 4: Secure Match a and b
1 function SecureMatch (a,b,θ )pk,pr ;
Input :a,b ∈ {0, 1}d , hamming distance threshold θ ,
public/private key pair (pk,pr )
Output : (a,b) or ∅
2 Alice: randomly generates an id aid and sends to Bob;
3 Bob: randomly generates an id bid and an integer r ;
4 Bob: initiates s with Epk (r );
5 for i ∈ [0, . . . ,d − 1] do
6 Alice: sends to Bob Epk (a[i]);
7 Bob: updates
s = s +h Epk (a[i])+h (Epk (a[i]) ×h (−2b[i]))+h Epk (b[i]);
8 end
9 Bob: sends (bid , s) to Alice ;
10 Alice: decrypts s = Dpr (s) ;
11 if s ≤ θ + r (secure integer comparison) then
12 return (a,b);
13 else
14 return ∅;
15 end
C ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
C.1 Example for secure pairwise match
Here we give an example for the function SMC(a,b) that outputs
(a,b) if they match; null otherwise. e matching rule is that
Euclidean distance of a and b is less than θ . First, Party Alice
creates a homomorphic public/private key pair (pk,pr ), and sends
the public key pk to party Bob. Let Epk (·) denote the encryption
function with public key pk and Dpr (·) the decryption function
with private key pr . Paillier’s cryptosystem supports the following
operations on the encrypted plain texts m1 and m2 without the
knowledge of the private key:
• Addition: Epk (m1 +m2) = Epk (m1) +h Epk (m2);
• Multiplication with constant c: Epk (cm1) = c ×h Em1
ese two operations allow secure computation of Euclidean dis-
tances, i.e. dist(a,b) = ∑i (a[i] − b[i])2 = ∑i (a[i])2 − 2a[i]b[i] +
(b[i])2, and also hamming distances for bit vectors, i.e. dist(a,b) =∑
i |a[i] − b[i]| =
∑
i a[i] + b[i] − 2a[i]b[i].
As summarized in Algorithm 4, given bit vectors a and b, Alice
will send to Bob the encrypted values (aid ,
{
Epk (a[i])
}) where aid
is a randomly generated record identier for record a. Next, party
Bob computes for each of its records bid the value Epk (a[i]) +h
Epk (a[i])×h (−2b[i])+h Epk (b[i])which is equal to Epk (|a[i]−b[i]|)
for all i , and computes the encrypted Epk (
∑
i |a[i]−b[i]|). A random
number r is generated and added to the encrypted distance, such
that the true distance is hidden from Alice if (a,b) is not a matching
pair. Party Bob creates the message (bid ,Epk (
∑
i |a[i]−b[i]|+r ) for
each record pair comparison. Alice can then decrypt the message
with her private key and obtain the relative distance d =
∑
i |a[i] −
b[i]|+r . Since Bob knows θ +r , a secure comparison protocol, such
as Yao’s garbled circuit [40], can be used to evaluate if d ≤ θ + r . If
this algorithm outputs “True”, Alice and Bob will exchange their
true record values.
C.2 Local DP Protocol
C.2.1 Theorem 4.1. Let B be a blocking that randomly hashes
records into a pre-specied set of k bin, such that Pr[B(b)=i]Pr[B(b′)=i] ≤ eϵ .
Such a blocking B satises ϵ-local DP (Appendix A.3). Protocols
that combine a local dierentially private blocking with IND-S2PC
protocols for record linkage to achieve (ϵ, negl(κ))-DPRL.
Proof. (sketch) We prove privacy for Bob (the proof for Alice is
analogous). In this protocol, Alice with input Data DA has a view
consisting of (1) the number of candidate matching pairs arising
in each (i, j) ∈ BS , (2) the output for each candidate matching
pair. Consider a neighboring pair (DB ,D ′B ) ∈ N (f1m (DA, ·)) for
a given DA. By eorem 3.6, DB and D ′B dier in only one non-
matching record with respect to DA, i.e. D ′B = DB − b∗ + b ′∗ and
b∗ , b ′∗, wherem(b∗,a) = 0 andm(b ′∗,a) = 0 for all a ∈ DA. Given
both b∗,b ′∗ can be hashed into the same bin with probability ratio
bounded by eϵ , the probabilities of generating the same number
of candidate matching pairs from DB and D ′B are also bounded by
the same ratio. e encrypted records only dier in b∗ and b ′∗, and
both of them lead to the same output for each candidate matching,
because they do not match any records in DA. 
In this work, we use randomized response (RR) [11] as an exam-
ple to achieve DPRL. Other local DP algorithms, such as Johnson-
Lindenstrauss (JL) transform [4] can be similarly applied.
C.2.2 RR based Blocking. Given a xed hash function h : Σ→
[0,k − 1], records in DB are hashed into k bins, B0, ..,Bk−1 respec-
tively. Let us dene a RR based on this xed hashing function with
privacy budget ϵB for Bob. Each record b ∈ DB is randomly hashed
into Bh(b) with probability pB = e
ϵB
k−1+eϵB and the other (k − 1)
bins with probability qB = 1k−1+eϵB . We denote the resulted bins
by B˜(DB ), and the resulted bin for each record b ∈ DB by B˜(b).
Similarly, using the same xed hashing function and randomized
response, Alice’s records DA are randomly hashed into the k bins,
B˜(DA) with corresponding pA,qA based on ϵA. is randomized
response with probabilities (pA,qA) and (pB ,qB ) ensures ϵA-local
DP and ϵB -local DP respectively.
Consider a basic blocking strategy BS = {(i, i)|i ∈ [0,k)}, all
corresponding bins are compared. If the hash function h is a LSH,
then matching records are likely fall into the same bin as Alice
and Bob use the same hash function. e probability that such
records (a,b) appear in the same bin aer randomization Pr[B˜(a) =
B˜(b)|h(a) = h(b)] is pApB + (k − 1)qAqB . is probability increases
with the privacy budget ϵA, ϵB , and hence recall will improves.
A further trade-o between correctness, privacy and eciency
is allowed by considering a general blocking strategy BS = {(i, (i +
j)%k)|i ∈ [0,k), j ∈ [0,k ′)}, each record in B˜i (DA) is securely
compared with k ′ neighboring bins of Bob. e basic blocking
strategy corresponds to the case where k ′ = 1. As k ′ increases,
more candidate matching pairs are securely compared, resulting
potentially higher recall and more communication and computation
cost. When k ′ = k , the resulted protocol is equivalent to the all
pairwise comparisons baseline.
C.2.3 Optimal RR Probability. If the window size k ′ is given in
advance as a parameter for the eciency, the expected recall of ran-
domized response can be further optimized. Let pBi be the probabil-
ity for a record b ∈ DB to be randomly hashed into B(h(b)+i)%k . To
ensure ϵB -DPRL, the probabilities to hash any pairs of bins should
be bounded by eϵB . e hashing probability for Alice records, pAi ,
is similarly dened and constrained. As each record of Alice’s can
fall into any bin, and each bin of Alice’s is compared with k ′ neigh-
boring bins of Bob’s, the probability that a matching pair (a,b) is
compared aer randomization is
p(a,b) =
k−1∑
i=0
k ′−1∑
j=0
pAi p
B
i+j%k . (16)
e expected recall can be improved by maximizingp(a,b) (Eqn. (16))
with the constraints on
(a) Ratio: p
B
i
pBi′
≤ eϵB ,∀i , i ′; pAi
pAi′
≤ eϵA ,∀i , i ′;
(b) Sum:
∑k−1
i=0 p
A
i = 1;
∑k−1
i=0 p
B
i = 1.
e solution in Section C.2.2 where we assign a high probability
to a single bin, and a low probability to the rest of the bins is a
valid solution to the maximization problem, but it is not always
the optimal solution. In general, this optimization can be solved by
existing tools for quadratic objectives with linear constraints, such
as quadratic programming.
Here, we present an explicit solution for the special case when
ϵB = ϵ ≥ 0 and ϵA → ∞. is case corresponds to the situation
where Alice’s data is public and only Bob’s data requires ϵ-DPRL
protection. en the expected recall can be maximized by solving
the following linear optimization:
max
pB0 , ...,p
B
k−1
k ′−1∑
i=0
pBi s.t.
k−1∑
i=0
pBi = 1, and
pBi
pBi′
≤ eϵ ∀i , i ′
e expected recall is maximized with value p(a,b) = k
′eϵ
k−k ′+k ′eϵ at
pBi =
{
eϵ
k−k ′+k ′eϵ , for i = 0, . . . ,k
′ − 1
1
k−k ′+k ′eϵ , for i = k
′, . . . ,k − 1
If Bob’s records are uniformly distributed over the bins, then the
compression ratio w.r.t all pairwise comparisons (APC) is ρ = k ′k .
e maximized expected recall can be wrien as
p(a,b) =
ρeϵ
1 − ρ + ρeϵ . (17)
is equation explicitly form the relationship between correctness
(p(a,b)), privacy (ϵ) and eciency (ρ) of this protocol.
Theorem C.1. e basic RR mechanism achieves a constant factor
speedup in eciency given ϵB = ϵ ≥ 0, ϵA →∞, δA = δB = negl(κ)
and recall r .
Proof. Given a recall r = p(a,b), we have ρ = 1 − e
ϵ (1−r )
r+eϵ (1−r )
based on Eqn. (17). e improvement in eciency ρ is a constant
factor in terms of r and ϵ , independent of n. 
Next, we compute the optimal amongst a restricted class of
strategies for the more general case where ϵA = ϵB = ϵ , though
the explicit form for this case is unknown yet. e strategies we
consider are those where Alice and Bob (a) use symmetric proba-
bilities to assign a bin to each record, and (b) they both assign a
high probability p> to place a record from bin i to bins i through
(i + x − 1)%k (for some 1 ≤ x ≤ k ′), and a low probability p⊥ to
assign a record from bin i to the rest of the bins. Note that, when
only one of Alice or Bob is randomizing their records, x = k ′ results
in the RR probabilities that optimize the expected recall.
In order to satisfy the constraints in the above maximization
problem, we need p> = e
ϵ
k−x+x ·eϵ and p⊥ =
1
k−x+x ·eϵ .
e expected recall can be derived as follows. Without loss of
generality consider a matching pair (a,b) that fall into bin 0. ere
are 3 ways (a,b) are matched aer randomization:
(i): Both Alice and Bob randomize their records to a > bin (i.e.,
some bin 0 ≤ j ≤ x − 1). Since x ≤ k ′, these records are denitely
compared. is occurs with probability x (x+1)2 p2>
(ii): Only one of Alice and Bob randomize their records to a >
bin (i.e., some bin 0 ≤ j ≤ x − 1). ere 2k ′x − x(x + 1) ways in
which exactly one of a or b is randomized to a > bin, but still end
up geing compared by the algorithm. is occurs with probability
(2k ′x − x(x + 1))p> · p⊥
(ii): Both Alice and Bob randomize their records to a ⊥ bin. is
occurs with probability (kk ′− (2k ′x − x (x+1)2 ))p2⊥ In total, the prob-
ability that (a,b) are compared is expressed in terms of x as
p(a,b)(x) =
x(x + 1)
2 p
2> + (2k ′x − x(x + 1))p> · p⊥
+(kk ′ − (2k ′x − x(x + 1)2 ))p
2⊥
e derivative of p(a,b)(x) w.r.t x is
p′(a,b)(x) = C1 · [(eϵ − 1)C2x + k(2k ′ + eϵ − 1)],
whereC1 = e
ϵ−1
2(k−x+xeϵ )3 andC2 = (eϵ −3+2k−4k ′). WhenC2 > 0,
the derivative is always positive, the expected recall is maximized
when x = k ′, as 0 < x ≤ k ′. We will leave the complete analysis to
the future work.
D ADDITIONAL PLOT
Figure 5 shows the log(base 10) value of the average cost with
respect to the log value of data size for PSI+X, APC, and LP with
ϵ ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 1.6} and δ = 10−5 and the non-private seing (np)
when they achieve a recall > 0.95. Similar to Figure 2, LP gives
lower costs than the baselines, and scales near linearly.
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Figure 5: e average log(cost) vs log(data size)
